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187 
QING CHINA AND THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF 
MENTAL INFIRMITY: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH 
IN TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR WILLIAM C. JONES 
WILLIAM P. ALFORD∗  
CHIEN-CHANG WU∗∗ 
It is difficult to thank Bill Jones adequately for the contributions that he 
has made to the study of Chinese law and legal history. The most obvious 
of these lie in the work that he led in translating the last major imperial 
Chinese legal code—the Da Qing Lu Li [The Great Qing Code]1—and the 
first precursor of the civil code of the People’s Republic of China—the 
Minfa Tongzi [General Principles of the Civil Law]2—into English, in 
each instance accompanied by an introductory essay of piercing insight 
situating the work both in Chinese history and legal history beyond China. 
This undertaking, which drew richly upon an understanding of Western 
legal history unparalleled by scholars of China, has had the desired impact 
of making these works accessible to a far broader swath of scholars than 
the small community of specialists in Chinese legal studies, even as it has 
markedly advanced interchange in that community. Beyond these larger 
projects, the scores of articles that Professor Jones has over the years 
produced on a range of subjects from matters of criminal law in the Qing 
Code to issues of civil law in contemporary China have been as powerful 
intellectually as anything written in their field in the twentieth century. In 
addition, one cannot take full account of Professor Jones’s professional 
life without acknowledging his generous nurturing of a broad panorama of 
younger scholars in law, history, and Sinology. 
One of Professor Jones’s less obvious, but no less crucial, contributions 
can be found in his deep-seated appreciation of the complexity of the 
subject matter of his inquiry which, in turn, evidences his genuine respect 
for that he is examining, even if he is, at times, sharply critical of it. Stated 
differently, in his fierce determination to understand the internal logic of 
Chinese legal history and his no less earnest commitment to relate that to 
the experience of other civilizations, Professor Jones has managed to steer 
 
 
 ∗ William P. Alford is Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law, Associate Dean for the Graduate 
Program and International Legal Studies, and Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law 
School. 
 ∗∗ Chien-Chang Wu is a psychiatrist and lawyer now studying for a doctoral degree of Health 
Policy at the Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. 
 1. WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE (1994). 
 2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW IN CHINA (William C. Jones ed., 1989). 
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clear of the excessive devotions to universalism or particularism that have 
tended increasingly to characterize a goodly proportion of American legal 
scholarship in recent years. The former and clearly predominant trend, 
with its emphasis on employing an economic, deconstructionist, or more 
idiosyncratically normative approach (typically drawn exclusively from 
Western experience and applied in broad strokes) runs a risk of slighting 
those very features of the history and experience of other societies that 
may be most novel and so stretch our imaginations. That trend, 
unfortunately, has been met in some circles by a no less constraining 
particularism that is so inherently relativistic that it stifles efforts to see 
genuinely common patterns and so, ironically, blurs what may, in fact, be 
most distinctive about the different ways in which societies separated by 
distance or time, may see and use law. Throughout his scholarly life, 
Professor Jones has been able to chart admirably a middle course, as 
exemplified by his preference to identify the questions that powerfully 
illuminate underlying patterns, rather than assert conclusive answers to 
them. 
This short tribute to Professor Jones aspires toward the high standard 
he continues to set as it reports briefly on research being conducted into 
the legal treatment of madness in late imperial China. As the work of 
Michel Foucault, among others, has demonstrated, an inquiry into 
definitions, legal and otherwise, of insanity and the treatment thereof is 
revealing not only about its immediate subject matter, but as well for what 
it suggests about that which a society understands to be normal behavior.3 
Notwithstanding the brilliant work by Arthur Kleinman on mental illness 
in Chinese society,4 and the alarming reports by Robin Munro on the 
abusive use of psychiatric confinement in the People’s Republic of China,5 
there is, however, surprisingly little written, whether by Chinese or 
Western scholars, regarding the legal construction of insanity in China.  
Contemporary scholarly understanding of the legal treatment of 
insanity in late imperial China is principally a product of the scholarship 
of Derk Bodde6 and Vivien Ng.7 Bodde’s treatment is, to be sure, quite 
 
 
 3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF 
REASON (1965). 
 4. See, e.g., NORMAL AND ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR IN CHINESE CULTURE (Arthur Kleinman & 
Tsung-yi Lin, eds. 1981). 
 5. Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and Its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
1 (2000). Some, including Professor Kleinman, take issue with Munro’s characterization of the PRC’s 
abuse of psychiatry. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Psychiatric Group to Investigate China, But Resists 
Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at A3. 
 6. See especially Derk Bodde, Age, Youth and Infirmity in the Law of Ch’ing China, in ESSAYS 
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brief, but as the leading historian of Chinese law of his generation, his 
characterization remains influential. Mental illness, for Bodde, was viewed 
so uneasily by the late Qing that the dynasty chose to accord it no legal 
weight, other than as a possible rationale that might be invoked to mitigate 
punishment in certain types of capital cases. The proof for this 
understanding, he suggests, lay in the absence of any mention of feng 
(madness in general), diang (madness generated by an excess of yin) or 
guang (madness generated by an excess of yang), save in the context of 
homicide, in the Qing Code itself, the principal official commentary on the 
Code, or the two most significant collections of Qing cases (the Xing’an 
Huilan (XAHL) or the Xing’an Huilan Xubian (XAHLXB)).8 This is in 
contrast to the appearance of diang and guang in Tang and other pre-Qing 
documents as categories of critically disabling madness.9 
Ng offers a far more comprehensive account in her impressive book-
length study of the changing characterization of madness over the course 
of late imperial Chinese history. Her book is grounded in both the legal 
and medical histories of late imperial China10 and displays an admirable 
appreciation of the sophistication with which at least some in Qing 
officialdom were able to address complex legal questions. Nonetheless, 
even as it charts how the state’s approach moved over time from that 
regarding madness as “illness” to one of seeing it as “deviance,” Ng’s 
book seems driven by a determination to show a strong trend toward 
convergence in what she regards as a modern, highly rational treatment of 
this issue. Hence, the book concludes that:  
[T]he humane quality of the Qing laws [is] . . . truly remarkable, 
especially in light of the fact that criminals in China did not have 
lawyers such as John Erskine or Alexander Cockburn [who 
defended Daniel M’Naghten in the famed British case bearing his 
name that provided the foundation for contemporary approaches to 
the issue of the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill] to 
formulate arguments in their defense. It is equally noteworthy that, 
even without the advocacy system, Qing jurists were able to arrive 
 
 
IN CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION 151 (Jerome Alan Cohen et al. eds., 1980). 
 7. VIVIEN W. NG, MADNESS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: FROM ILLNESS TO DEVIANCE (1990). 
 8. XING’AN HUILAN [CONSPECTUS OF PENAL CASES] (Bao Shuyun ed., reprint 1968). XING’AN 
HUILAN XUBIAN [SUPPLEMENT TO THE CONSPECTUS OF PENAL CASES] (Wu Chao & He Xiyan eds., 
under the supervision of Xue Yunsheng, reprint 1970). 
 9. See 4 LI DAI XINGFA GAO [THE TREATISE ON PENAL LAW OF THE SUCCESSIVE DYNASTIES] 
2202 (Shen Jiaben ed., reprint 1985). 
 10. For a fascinating exploration of the history of medicine in China, see PAUL U. UNSCHULD, 
MEDICINE IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF IDEAS (1985).  
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at tests of insanity that were similar to those delineated in the 
landmark M’Naghten case of 1843.11 
Our very preliminary work, focused on an examination of the principal 
private commentary on the Qing Code, as well as the century and a half of 
Qing cases contained in the XAHL and the XAHLXB, indicates that while 
the Qing did not confine its treatment of madness to cases of homicide, 
nor can one trace as distinct an evolutionary path toward the equivalent of 
the M’Naghten test as Ng suggests. Professor Bodde is, indeed, correct in 
directing our attention to homicide as we seek to understand where 
madness entered the thinking of Qing lawmakers. The majority of the 
almost sixty cases in the XAHL and XAHLXB that we identified 
concerning insanity—and that, in some instances, themselves subsequently 
formed the nucleus of new li (sub-statutes in the Code)—did, indeed, 
involve homicide. But our research also uncovered another nineteen cases 
involving insanity, including fourteen concerned with the application to 
persons said to be mad of statutes outlawing other behavior, and five 
regarding the detention by the authorities of alleged madmen other than in 
the setting of criminal accusations. From these treatments of the pertinence 
of the defendant’s madness in the application of statutory provisions, 
concerning matters ranging from unlawful entry onto imperial palace 
grounds to false accusation to physical injury to rape, one can see that 
Qing law regarding madness was not limited exclusively to homicide, but 
occasionally extended to other serious crimes, as well as to non-criminal 
situations. 
The fact that the legal treatment of madness in the Qing extended 
beyond homicide does not necessarily lead, however, to the conclusion 
that it took on key features associated with the treatment of such issues in 
the modern west, as Professor Ng’s argument suggests. To be sure, the 
rather stripped–down nature of the cases contained in the XAHL and the 
XAHLXB does complicate any effort to make conclusive assertions as to 
the legal reasoning that informed late Qing officialdom as it sought to 
apply the law. Nonetheless, our preliminary examination of the fifty-nine 
cases addressing madness indicates the Qing did not frame the issue along 
the lines of the M’Naghten test. That test focused on ascertaining whether 
the defendant’s mental illness was such as to preclude the establishment of 
 
 
 11. Ng, supra note 7, at 171. The M’Naghten test provides, in the words of Lord Chief Justice 
Tindal, that “it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused 
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from the disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and the quality of the act he was doing: or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing 
was wrong.” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 ENG. REP. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). 
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mens rea, in the sense of the defendant having understood at the time that 
“what he was doing was wrong,” as stated by Lord Chief Justice Tindal. In 
the Qing cases we examined, the defendant’s thought processes or 
appreciation of the consequences of his actions mattered far less than the 
actual actions undertaken and hence, could not serve as a rationalization 
for or excuse of such actions. Social order having been rent asunder, there 
was, in effect, a societal need to provide redress, even in instances where 
the offending action seems to have sprung from madness more than 
deliberate deed. 
The foregoing distinction is borne out by those two cases from the 
XAHLXB containing the fullest discussion of the legal consequence of 
madness. The first, arising in 1867, involved accusations of murder by one 
Han Ming of his employer’s wife.12 Han was reported by witnesses to 
have suffered from intermittent madness over the years. Eventually, Han’s 
employer discharged him, leading Han to make entreaties to the victim. 
When these were rebuffed, Han wounded her fatally with a knife, with 
which he then wounded himself. Notwithstanding the district magistrate’s 
acceptance of this account of the fatality, the Board of Punishment took a 
quite different tack, indicating, in effect, that Han’s awareness of the 
rightness or wrongness of his actions was, in the end, less important than 
the fact of his having committed the murder. Similarly, in a case arising in 
1854, concerning an accusation of decapitation by one Yu Sheng, who was 
reported to have been mad since his teenage days, the Board chose not to 
inquire into Yu’s state of mind, in effect, determining that the actions 
involved spoke for themselves.13 
To observe the absence of a M’Naghten like test, or something akin to 
a contemporary notion of mens rea is not to suggest that the Qing was 
indifferent to madness or conflated the intentional and unintentional. 
Article 292 of the Qing Code,14 for instance, does not concern madness but 
does hold out the possibility of the monetary redemption by those causing 
certain accidental deaths, while the XAHL and XAHLXB do contain a 
number of cases in which evidence of madness appears clearly to have led 
to a mitigation of punishment. We refrain here from asserting that, at this 
stage in our research, we have a definitive answer to this seeming paradox 
or that what we have so far unearthed establishes either unmistakable 
convergence with or absolute divergence from Western models. 
Suggestively, however, we would note that even if the defendant’s mental 
 
 
 12. See XING’AN HUILAN XUBIAN, supra note 8, at 3003-05.  
 13. Id. 
 14. JONES, supra note 1, art. 292. 
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state might not absolve him of criminal responsibility and placate society’s 
need for redress, diminished mental capacity might well justify the 
imposition of a lesser sanction by a self-described awesome, but 
benevolent state, provided, of course, that the offense in question did not 
itself directly challenge state authority.15 
Clearly, there is a great deal more that we and other scholars need to do 
before we are able to make definitive statements about the legal 
construction and treatment of madness in late imperial Chinese law. Still, 
in an effort to pay homage to Professor Jones and his asking of the telling 
question, we hope that this brief report of an early exploration of late Qing 
law will prove of use, even as we acknowledge our inability to put to rest 
the issues it seeks to raise. 
 
 
 15. Violations of any of the shi o [ten heinous offenses] were dealt with severely, even if they did 
not involve homicide. Indeed, some (such as those involving impiety towards one’s parents) called for 
greater sanctions than homicide involving a stranger. 
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